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 Corporation and Contract
 Henry Hansmann, Yale Law School
 Publicly traded corporations rarely use the nearly absolute freedom afforded them to
 draft charters that deviate from the default terms of state corporation law. Conven-
 tional explanations for this phenomenon are unconvincing. A more promising expla-
 nation lies in the lack of any feasible amendment mechanism that will assure efficient
 adaptation of charter terms as changing circumstances dictate during the long expected
 lifetime of a public corporation. In effect, by adopting state law default terms, corpora-
 tions delegate to the state the process of amending charter provisions over time.
 The great bulk of corporate law deals with relationships among the
 owners and managers of firms. These relationships are, at bottom, contrac-
 tual, in the sense that the parties involved enter into them voluntarily and
 they do not directly affect third parties. This leads one naturally to ask why
 we need rules of law to govern these relationships. Why is corporate govern-
 ance a matter of law, rather than of contract?
 The conventional wisdom today is that the internal affairs of business
 corporations are, in fact, almost completely contractual. Most of the provi-
 sions in business corporation statutes are just default rules. If an alternative
 is desired, it can simply be put in the corporation's charter, displacing the
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 statutory provision. As a consequence, either these provisions are inconse-
 quential (Black, 1990), or they have at most a modest influence. The reasons
 why default rules might have some influence include the transaction costs of
 drafting and negotiating, the high salience or presumptive legitimacy of
 governmentally provided terms, the need for standardization, and the bur-
 den of deviating from information-forcing "penalty defaults."
 There is surely some truth in these views. I believe, however, that the con-
 ventional wisdom understates both the degree of contractual freedom facing
 business firms today and the rarity with which that freedom is exercised, and as
 a consequence understates, as well, the great influence exercised by corporate
 law's default rules, particularly on publicly traded firms. More important, I
 believe that there is a better explanation than those conventionally offered for
 the strong influence exercised by the default rules of corporate law. The essence
 of this explanation is that, by adopting default rules of law rather than using
 explicit contracting, parties allow for the constant readjustment of their rela-
 tionship over the long period of time that it may last. The provisions of
 corporate law are essentially contract terms that can be repeatedly reformed
 by a third party - the state - to adapt them to changing circumstances. Thus,
 paradoxically, the great advantage of law over contract in organizing corpora-
 tions is that rules of law are more easily changed. This theory provides much
 stronger reason for deferring to the law's default rules than do the other theories
 that have been offered. It implies that default rules may often be nearly as
 influential as mandatory rules, and that scholars are not wasting their time
 debating whether one rule of corporate law is more desirable than another even
 if, as is typical, the rule chosen will be formulated only as a default.
 The Extreme Contractualization of Corporate Forms
 Even more than is commonly realized, virtually all of corporate law
 today consists of default rules rather than mandatory rules.
 When the corporate form became widely available in the latter part of
 the nineteenth century, it was relatively inflexible. To have the benefit of
 limited liability and freely tradable shares that it offered, an organization
 had to adopt a relatively rigid structure. Over the succeeding century and a
 half, the corporate form was gradually liberalized to permit increasing
 freedom in tailoring the allocation of earnings and control. And now,
 over the past 25 years, we have achieved even greater liberalization with
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 four newly established limited liability forms: the limited liability company
 (LLC), the limited liability partnership, the limited liability limited part-
 nership, and the statutory business trust. These new forms permit creation
 of a full limited liability entity, without the remaining rigidities of the
 business corporation statutes.1
 In this regard, the statutory business trust, first adopted in Delaware in
 1988, represents the conceptual endpoint. It offers virtually complete con-
 tractual freedom with respect to assignment of earnings, control, and even
 fiduciary duties. In fact, the form does not even offer default terms for most
 matters; nearly everything is left to the firm's creators, to be specified in the
 firm's governing instrument (Hansmann and Mattei, 1998; Sitkoff, 2005).
 This progressive liberalization seems best understood as the conse-
 quence of an increasing ability to protect both creditors and equity inves-
 tors by contractual means rather than by reliance on organizational
 constraints (Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, forthcoming). It is the
 result of a variety of developments in fields such as bankruptcy law, tax
 law, accounting practices, credit reporting services, communications, cal-
 culating technology, and commercial contracting. Much of this increased
 flexibility in corporate law was originally focused on small firms. For
 example, the special provisions for close corporations in Delaware's cor-
 poration law were, and still are, limited to firms that have no more than
 30 shareholders.
 The four new forms of the past 25 years, however, are not confined to
 closely held firms. Rather, the nearly limitless contractual flexibility they
 offer is available to publicly traded firms as well. The result is that, in
 substance, all mandatory terms in state corporate law have now been elimi-
 nated.' Today, if a firm wants the full limited liability and publicly tradable
 shares of a business corporation, and also wants access to Delaware's famous
 chancery courts, but wishes at the same time to avoid some of the remaining
 mandatory elements of Delaware corporation law, the firm can simply form
 as a Delaware LLC or Delaware business trust. Virtually all rules of Delaware's
 general corporation law are, consequently, now just default rules. The
 remaining mandatory constraints on the corporate form are just those to
 be found in federal securities law or in the stock exchange listing rules.
 1. The evolution of these entities is described in Hansmann, Kraakman, and
 Squire (2005) and Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire (forthcoming).
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 These developments might suggest that corporate structure in general,
 including the structure of publicly traded firms, is becoming an increasingly
 contractual subject, with ever greater delegation to the actors directly
 involved - that is, to investors and managers - of responsibility for the
 design of intracorporate relationships. In fact, one might go further and
 wonder why, now that we have the statutory business trust, we need any of
 the other statutory forms at all. The business trust provides the only attri-
 butes of a firm for which law is truly essential - namely, the rules governing
 the rights and expectations of third parties, including particularly the rules of
 asset partitioning that govern creditors' rights and the related rules of agency
 law that govern the authority of corporate actors to make commitments that
 bind the firm (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000). In principle, everything
 else - all matters of internal relationships - can be handled by contract. So it
 seems that there is nothing that one can do with a business corporation
 statute, or with the three other new statutory forms, that cannot also be done
 with the business trust. All that is required is some additional drafting.
 The Paucity of Corporate Contracting
 Yet the extraordinary freedom that is now available to the drafters of
 corporate charters is exploited in remarkably small degree. While closely
 held business firms commonly have detailed, specifically tailored charters,
 the charters of publicly traded corporations are remarkably empty. They are
 commonly just a few pages long and contain very little of interest. They
 effectively defer to the default terms of the state corporation law in virtually
 all matters of significance. If they contain anything else at all, it generally
 involves one or more of a few simple standardized deviations of a general
 character - such as provision for a staggered board or for dual class stock -
 that entail choosing well-established alternatives from the statutory menu.
 We do not see corporate charters trying out any of the big reforms that are
 routinely pressed today, such as takeover rules along the lines of the British
 City Code, or expanded shareholder nomination rights, or constraints on
 the structure and disclosure of executive compensation.2
 2. I base this qualitative observation, in part, on examination of a sample of
 corporate charters generously shared with me by Michael Klausner and collected
 in the course of his work with Robert Daines. See Daines and Klausner (2001).
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.166 on Mon, 18 Sep 2017 18:06:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Corporation and Contract 5
 Meanwhile, the statutory business trust has not, in fact, been used for
 interesting experiments with publicly traded firms. Rather, it has been used
 almost exclusively for just two standardized purposes: asset securitization
 and formation of mutual funds. In fact, the uses of the business trust have
 been so unimaginative that, in the 17 years since Delaware first enacted its
 business trust statute, there has apparently been only one reported decision
 interpreting that statute (Sitkoff, 2005, pp. 38-39).
 Why Not More Contractualization?
 Why do the terms of corporate charters follow the statutory defaults so
 closely? Although the reasons conventionally offered surely have some
 weight, they seem quite inadequate to explain the phenomenon in full.
 To illustrate, I review briefly the most familiar of those reasons.
 Transaction Costs of Drafting Are High
 The most commonly offered argument for default terms, in corporate law
 as in other forms of contracting, is that they economize on the transaction
 costs of drafting (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989, p. 1444). This might
 explain why some small closely held corporations defer to default rules,
 but it seems extraordinary to believe that the transaction costs of drafting
 could be an important consideration for the charters of publicly held firms
 (Ayres, 1992, p. 1397). Yet it is closely held firms that have customized
 charters and publicly held firms that hew slavishly to the defaults.
 Charter Terms Are a Public Good
 A related argument for the dearth of privately crafted corporate charter
 provisions is that innovation in charter terms is a public good, and that
 consequently it is not worthwhile for private actors to incur the expense of
 developing innovative terms (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989, pp. 1445-46).
 But this is entirely unpersuasive. Drafting charter terms is not all that
 expensive. Lawyers routinely draft complex new documents for all sorts of
 purposes, many of which - such as those involved in asset securitization -
 form the basis for publicly traded securities and are easily subject to
 copying by others. Most conspicuously, the public goods problem has
 not prevented development of private standard forms for bond indentures,
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 nor has it prevented regular innovation in those forms (see Kahan and
 Klausner, 1993). What is more, some organizations have even established
 property rights in standard contract forms and make money from selling
 them. The American Institute of Architects, for example, sells construction
 contracts that they have developed and keep up to date, and that have
 become the industry standard (Davis, forthcoming).
 Network Effects Compel Standardization
 Klausner (1995) has argued that the default rules of corporate law gain
 much of their force from the need for standardization that derives from
 network effects (see also Kahan and Klausner, 1997). These third-party
 network benefits include the greater certainty that derives from judicial
 interpretation of similar terms in other firms' charters, the reduced cost of
 legal services resulting from a focus by lawyers on a narrower range of
 terms, and the lower costs to prospective investors in evaluating already-
 familiar terms. While these benefits could presumably be achieved by
 adopting privately drafted standard forms, law has the advantage, under
 this view, of providing a conspicuous focal point that facilitates choice of
 the common standard (Klausner, 1995, p. 828).
 There is surely some force to this theory. But there are reasons to doubt
 that it provides a satisfactory explanation for the dominant role of law in
 structuring the internal affairs of corporations. For one thing, it seems to
 exaggerate the demand for uniformity. The stock market has, for instance,
 happily accepted firms with unusual internal structures. To take one con-
 spicuous example, in 1994 United Air Lines was reorganized to give
 majority voting control to its employees. Though it was a Delaware
 corporation, the structure of control and earnings rights embedded in the
 company's new charter was extremely unorthodox and highly complex,
 with a variety of novel means for selecting directors, odd committee
 structures on the board, numerous classes of stock with extremely
 unorthodox rights and restrictions, and dramatically shifting contingent
 relations between share ownership and voting rights.3 Yet stock in the
 reorganized firm was enthusiastically embraced by the markets and
 remained one of the darlings of Wall Street for several years afterward.
 3. For a brief summary, see Hansmann (1996, pp. 117-18).
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 Moreover, the theory that the requisite standard form charter terms
 must be provided by law, rather than by privately provided standard forms
 because law offers a powerful focal point, also seems difficult to reconcile
 with the evidence. In particular, the focal point theory of the role of law
 does not distinguish well between those areas in which standard form
 terms are provided by law, as they are in the internal affairs of publicly
 held firms, and those areas in which the standard form terms are privately
 provided, as they are in bond indentures.
 Innovative Terms Will Not Be Priced
 A closely related argument is that the market is incapable of pricing
 particular legal terms in a corporate charter, either for of lack of ability, or
 for lack of attention. Consequently, design of the charter cannot be varied
 freely in individual cases.
 If this explanation were true, it would throw serious doubt on the
 efficiency of the securities markets. But there is good evidence that it is
 not true. For example, indentures for corporate bonds run to scores or
 even hundreds of pages, and often contain complex covenants restraining
 the actions of corporate managers. Yet these bonds commonly trade freely,
 and there is good evidence that the securities market prices their terms with
 reasonable efficiency (Kahan, 1995, pp. 574-80).
 Statutory Terms Are Penalty Defaults
 Ayres and Gertner (1989) have argued persuasively that many default
 rules for contractual relations serve as information-forcing "penalty
 defaults" that, by burdening the better-informed party to the transaction,
 face that party with the choice of accepting the burdensome default or
 revealing to the other party information that will be helpful in achieving
 alternative terms that are fair and efficient. Depending on the tradeoff of
 costs and benefits involved, the incentive to deviate from these terms might
 often be modest.
 Yet many of the rules of corporate law do not seem structured as penalty
 defaults. Indeed, if anything, United States corporate law seems to have a
 distinct managerialist tilt, with the consequence that deviation from the
 default rules would presumably be in the direction of favoring dispersed
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 shareholders, who are presumably the least-informed parties to the corpo-
 rate contract. Moreover, penalty defaults would not be having their intended
 effect if they were to discourage all deviation from the standard terms.
 The Need to Modify Relational Contracts
 Why, then, do we observe such a radical scarcity of private contracting
 in the charters of publicly held corporations? The reasons are surely
 complex. But the evidence suggests that the most important reason lies in
 the need to modify charters over time.
 Publicly traded business corporations often have very long lifetimes -
 commonly scores of years, and sometimes hundreds. Changes in the firm
 and in the surrounding society are highly likely to call for occasional
 changes in the firm's internal relationships. If these relationships are
 fixed by the firm's original charter, obsolescence will be the result. But if
 the firm's charter is instead provided by law, it is potentially much more
 flexible. The legislature or the courts can simply change the law to adapt.
 A prototypical example is the shareholder vote required to approve a
 merger. Before 1963 the default rule in Delaware, as in other states, was
 two-thirds of the outstanding shares of stock. In that year the default - and
 the mandatory minimum - was dropped to a simple majority. That change
 was arguably efficient in light of contemporary changes in shareholding
 patterns, the greater efficiency of market institutions, and the increasing
 need that new technologies brought for recombinations of corporate
 assets. But if the merger rules had been embodied in corporate charters
 rather than in Delaware law, many corporations would have been stuck
 with the anachronistic two-thirds supermajority vote requirement, which
 could not be changed without the same supermajority vote.
 Of course, as the example of the merger vote suggests, all of this
 depends on the mechanisms available for amending the corporate charter.
 There are various mechanisms employed in different jurisdictions, but all
 of them require, at some point, a vote of approval by the shareholders.
 And it is hard to conceive of a charter amendment mechanism that would
 not involve such a vote. Yet it is a familiar fact that there is no simple
 voting rule that assures an efficient choice.
 In the U.S. a company's board of directors must propose charter
 amendments, presumably to mitigate some of the pathologies of pure
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 shareholder democracy. Yet the managerial veto fails to cure all the
 problems with shareholder voting - most obviously, because the directors
 themselves are elected by the shareholders - and adds some obvious pro-
 blems of its own, including aggravation of the managerial agency problem.
 Nor does the market for corporate control solve the problem, since it, too,
 ultimately depends on the internal political mechanisms of the firm.
 In short, if charters are made hard to amend, they threaten to lock in bad
 terms or to give holdup power to one group or another, whereas, if they are
 made easy to amend, there is too much room for opportunism or ignorance
 on the part of either shareholders or managers. The ultimate problem for
 corporate structures, then, is one of politics - the internal politics of the
 firm. The limitations of collective choice mechanisms render them inade-
 quate to assure efficient adaptability of a corporation's structure over time.
 The State as Reviser of Contracts
 Given this problem, there are potential advantages to delegating to a
 third party the responsibility for adjusting, as time and circumstance
 require, the terms of the basic contract among a company's shareholders
 and managers. The state serves as that third party. Through statutory
 amendments or judicial decisions, the state can, in effect, alter the corpo-
 rate charter when the need arises. By accepting the statutory defaults,
 shareholders and managers delegate to government the task of revising
 their contractual relations over time.
 There are, of course, difficulties with this form of delegation: the state
 may have purposes of its own unrelated to the efficient organization of
 enterprise, the relevant state actors may not always be well informed, and
 the result may be excessive standardization of the corporate form. I will
 say more about these problems shortly. The relevant consideration, how-
 ever, is that reliance on corporations themselves to adjust their charters
 over time may give rise to even greater problems. Consequently, purcha-
 sers of corporate securities in widely held firms might reasonably prefer
 that corporate charters accept statutory default terms simply to get the
 flexibility that comes with state-provided terms.
 This is not a novel theory about the role of law. Oliver Williamson
 (1976), for example, argued long ago that public utility regulation serves to
 provide the necessary adaptive governance structure for long-term
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 relational contracts that require continuous readjustment. I am simply
 observing here that the relations within a corporation are also long-term
 relational contracts, and hence it is reasonable that the best governance
 structure for these contracts is, in effect, the government.4'
 Does the Theory Fit the Facts?
 Can we, however, be certain that the need for adaptability is an important
 reason that publicly traded corporations so consistently defer to the default terms
 of corporate law? Evidence in favor is that the proposition is broadly consistent
 with the pattern of corporate chartering that we see. Corporations that reject the
 statutory default terms in favor of elaborately crafted special charter provisions
 typically exhibit either or both of two characteristics. First - as in the case of many
 small firms with elaborately specialized rights involving board positions, employ-
 ment rights, and withdrawal or sale of shares - the firms have a small number of
 owners who can renegotiate the corporate structure among themselves with
 reasonable efficiency if substantial changes are called for. Second, as in the case
 of venture capital financed high-tech startup firms, they have a relatively short
 expected life, limiting the risk that the initial corporate structure will need adjust-
 ment before the firm is dissolved or reorganized along more conventional lines.
 Consider also, in this respect, the only two uses commonly made of the
 business trust, with its dearth of default rules. One of these uses is the forma-
 tion of mutual funds, which are publicly held and have indefinitely long lives.
 The principal governance terms of mutual funds are not specially crafted,
 however, but simply taken from a different statute: the Investment Company
 Act of 1940. The other use of the business trust, asset securitization, does in
 fact* employ detailed privately drafted governing instruments. But the entities
 are used to support debt securities that have relatively short lifespans, at the
 end of which the entities are dissolved. Similarly, the detailed covenants in
 junk bond indentures need only serve for the fixed life of the bonds involved.
 4. See also Gordon (1989, pp. 1573-1585) who presents a related theory in the
 context of corporate law, though he focuses on a justification for mandatory rules
 of corporate law rather than default rules. His argument is, in rough summary, that
 the available mechanisms for avoiding opportunistic amendment of corporate
 charters are so inadequate that there may be efficiency gains from making some
 rules - particularly those constraining insiders - mandatory, and then relying on the
 legislature, rather than corporate actors themselves, to change those rules when
 needed.
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 And what about United Air Lines, which, as already noted, was warmly
 received by the public stock markets even with a highly tailored charter? It is
 in fact consistent with the general pattern described here, since its original
 charter terms were not designed to govern the firm indefinitely. Rather, the
 elaborate and idiosyncratic provisions in that firm's 1994 charter were
 designed from the outset to sunset within no more than 20 years, after
 which the firm would return to a conventional governance structure.
 Another exception that proves the rule is that, as was famously discovered by
 Daines and Klausner (2001), a large proportion of companies newly going public
 put antitakeover provisions in their charters rather than defer to the statutory
 default rules in this area. These initial public offering charters do not actually
 contain what one would properly call antitakeover provisions. They do not, for
 example, explicitly require prior approval from the board of directors before
 specified types of control transactions can take place. Rather, they typically
 provide for such things as staggered boards, dual-class stock, authority to issue
 blank check preferred stock, or a prohibition on the ability of shareholders to act
 by written consents. It is the decisional law of Delaware (and other states) that
 says, in companies that have these features, managers can exercise broad author-
 ity to prevent hostile takeovers. But the scope of this authority is being continu-
 ally expanded and contracted by the courts, and could quickly be sharply
 constrained if the courts or the legislature ever saw fit to do so. As a consequence,
 it is perhaps not a great puzzle that institutional investors are willing to buy the
 stock of companies with these so-called antitakeover provisions in their charters.
 These investors are just buying into one of several standard statutory defaults
 that are always subject to amendment by the state. If, instead, these investors were
 confronted with a real antitakeover provision that was seriously embedded in the
 charter, they might be much less eager to invest.5
 5. The experience with tracking stock in recent decades might also be read as a
 reflection of the market's resistance to specially crafted terms in public company
 charters. Despite concerted efforts by investment banks to persuade companies to
 issue tracking stock, very few firms adopted these securities with their novel distinc-
 tions between the allocation of governance rights and the governance of rights to net
 earnings. It might be argued, however, that the resistance to tracking stock was largely
 based, not just on the possibility that it would lock firms into arrangements that might
 someday prove both troublesome and difficult to alter. It was also based on the fact
 that, right from the outset, tracking stock created such conspicuous and unmanage-
 able conflicts of interest within the issuing firms that it was very unlikely to increase
 aggregate firm value. See generally Hansmann (1996, pp. 63-64).
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 Further Empirical Evidence
 The delegated contracting theory offered here gains further support
 from a valuable systematic study of the impact of corporate law default
 rules undertaken by Yair Listokin (2005). Of particular relevance are
 Listokin's findings concerning statutory fair price provisions, which are a
 species of antitakeover rule that impedes two-tier takeovers in which the
 price paid in the first-step tender offer is higher than the price paid in the
 second-step freeze-out merger.6 Between 1983 and 1991, 27 states enacted
 fair price statutes. Three states made the statutory rule mandatory.
 Twenty- three states adopted provisions allowing companies to opt out of
 the rule, either by charter amendment (10 states), or by bylaw amendment
 (13 states). And one state, Georgia, required companies to opt into the
 statutory fair price provision (see Table 1).
 Listokin (2005) focuses principally on possible explanations for the
 difference between opt-in states and opt-out states - the difference between
 the figures in row 2 and those in row 3 - regarding the frequency with which
 companies adopted fair price provisions. Of most importance here, however,
 is the difference in the rate of adoption of fair price provisions between
 companies in states with no fair price statute (row 1) and the state (Georgia) with
 an opt-in statute (row 2). The adoption rate in Georgia is almost 3 times as
 high for companies overall and 6 times as high for companies newly going
 Table 1. Rate of Adoption of Fair Price Provisions in Charter
 All Companies Going Public
 Companies after Passage of the Statute
 1. Companies in states with no statute 20.4% 9.5%
 2. Companies in opt-in state (Georgia) 56.4% 57.1%
 3. Companies in opt-out states 98.4% 97.0%
 Notes: Listokin (2005, Tables 3 and 5).
 6. Listokin's article also reports rates of adoption for two other types of antitake-
 over devices that can be adopted in some states by either opting into or opting out
 of specially designed statutory provisions: control share acquisition statutes and
 business combination statutes. For lack of data, however, he could not report the
 frequency with which corporations adopted charter provisions with similar proper-
 ties in states that did not have specific statutory provisions of these types.
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 public. Listokin suggests briefly - consistent with the conventional wis-
 dom - that these differences may reflect the additional costs of drafting
 and negotiating a fair price charter provision that must be incurred in
 states without an opt-in statute (Listokin, 2005, p. 34). But it is hard to
 imagine that these costs could explain the difference. All management - or
 rather, management's lawyers - need do is copy one or another of the state
 statutory provisions, or another company's charter provision.
 Perhaps there is also a legitimation effect from an opt-in statute: both
 managers and shareholders may feel more comfortable enacting a charter
 amendment if it has been blessed beforehand by the relevant state corpora-
 tion law. But a more logical justification for the difference - and one that is
 perhaps influencing the choices of the lawyers, managers, and shareholders
 involved - is that a specially crafted charter provision is locked in until the
 charter is again amended to remove it (or alter it, or make other charter
 amendments that become appropriate to tailor its effects), whereas a provi-
 sion in the state's corporation statute can be altered as necessary over time
 by the state's legislature and judiciary to keep it consistent with changes in
 circumstances and in other aspects of the state's corporation law.
 Default versus Mandatory Terms
 The delegated contracting theory of corporate law offered here has the ironic
 implication that the most heavily regulated organizational forms may be, in the
 long term, the most adaptable. Most publicly traded business corporations,
 with their vacuous charters, are subject to the ever changing governance rules
 promulgated by the Delaware legislature and courts - rules that, it is frequently
 argued, in fact seem to change rather too often. In contrast, firms with detailed,
 privately crafted governing instruments are potentially rather rigid, capable of
 structural change only by securing the acquiescence of both shareholders and
 managers to a formal amendment of the charter.
 It makes no difference in this respect whether the rules of corporate law
 involved are mandatory or default rules. Both are equally subject to adjust-
 ment by the state, and potentially more adaptable than provisions embedded
 in a corporate charter. Moreover, so long as - to take advantage of the
 benefits of delegated contracting - publicly traded corporations routinely
 defer to virtually all terms of the corporation statute, those terms may as
 well be mandatory. In short, the difference between mandatory and default
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.166 on Mon, 18 Sep 2017 18:06:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 14 American Law and Economics Review V8 N1 2006 (1-19)
 terms of corporate law may often be of little significance, not because, as
 Black (1990) argued, mandatory rules are nearly as easy to avoid as default
 rules, but because the incentives for deferring to default rules are sufficiently
 strong to make them nearly as unavoidable as mandatory rules.
 Why Government?
 If government is playing the role of delegated third-party contracting
 agent for corporate investors and managers, it is natural to ask whether
 that role might alternatively be played by a private actor. Might a corpora-
 tion instead choose a law firm for that role, or perhaps a nonprofit trade
 association? Indeed, in the United Kingdom, the nongovernmental City of
 London Panel on Takeovers has set the terms for some of the most
 important aspects of corporate governance for the last 40 years.
 Evidently, what is needed for the role of delegated contracting agent is an
 institution that has substantial expertise, that has an interest in keeping the
 terms of corporate charters reasonably efficient, that can be counted on to last
 indefinitely, and that will remain relatively free from regulatory capture by one
 or the other corporate constituency. The state of Delaware fits this role well, for
 a number of familiar reasons (Romano, 1993). In particular, it is a small state
 that is not heavily industrialized and, consequently, contains very few of the
 shareholders or companies whose affairs it regulates, making the state essen-
 tially a third party in relation to those interests. It may be difficult for a private
 organization to achieve similar independence from the interested parties. For
 example, private arbitration has never played a large role in resolving intracor-
 porate disputes in the U.S. perhaps because arbitration works best where, as
 with commercial contracts, the parties to disputes are more symmetric and there
 is less reason for concern that the institution will have a systematic bias toward
 one side or the other (Dammann and Hansmann, 2005).7
 7. Hadfield and Talley (2004) offer reasons that, if private providers were other-
 wise as capable as public entities of providing corporate law, competition might
 lead to more efficient provision of law, if the providers were private firms rather
 than elected governments. However, their model does not focus on the particular
 characteristics of corporate law as being applicable to public versus private provi-
 sion of private goods in general. 8. Klausner (1995, pp. 837-41) also thoughtfully
 explores, in the context of his network theory, the potential for a single state to offer
 firms choices among alternative corporate law rules.
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 We see here the difference between the delegated contracting theory of
 corporate law and the network externalities theory. Under the latter the-
 ory, network interdependencies give corporations an incentive to choose
 common charter terms, and public provision of those terms is useful
 because it provides a strong focal point to coordinate choice. Under
 the delegated contracting theory offered here, in contrast, corporate char-
 ters must be subject to substantial amendment over time, and public
 institutions-legislatures and courts-have an advantage in providing those
 amendments because they can serve as relatively durable and trustworthy
 third parties that, though highly imperfect, avoid some of the conspicuous
 defects of the available mechanisms for charter amendment within cor-
 porations themselves. While this process of public amendment might work
 with privately drafted charter provisions, courts and legislatures will
 appropriately give much greater deference to private than to public (stat-
 utory and judge-made) provisions, hence rendering private provisions
 more inflexible and providing an incentive for firms to defer to the publicly
 provided terms-an incentive that would be present even absent network
 economies from having corporations choose similar terms for their char-
 ters. The two theories are, however, complementary and interrelated.
 Inter- versus Intrajurisdictional Choice
 The analysis offered here suggests that the governance of publicly
 traded firms will continue to be determined by the default terms of corpo-
 rate law rather than by contract. It does not necessarily imply, however,
 that there need be a unique set of default terms. There can be choice among
 sets of default rules. Thist kind of choice has, of course, been the focus of
 the extensive debate on regulatory competition in corporate law, which has
 concerned itself with the alternatives offered by different jurisdictions and
 with the appropriate degree of freedom of choice across jurisdictions.
 Intrajurisdictional choice is also a possibility, however, and in some
 ways a more promising one.8 Suppose, for example, that some state (say,
 Maryland) were to develop a corporation statute that offered a real
 8. Klausner (1995, pp. 837-41) also thoughtfully explores, in the context of his
 network theory, the potential for a single state to offer firms choices among
 alternative corporate law rules.
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 alternative to Delaware's - perhaps more proshareholder, more proman-
 agement, or more efficient in some other respect - and were to begin
 attracting corporations away from Delaware in significant number. What
 would keep Delaware from copying Maryland's statute, while also retain-
 ing its own preexisting statute for the sake of those firms that still prefer it?
 Put more generally, what is to prevent Delaware itself from offering a
 full set of competing corporation statutes and allowing companies to
 choose among them? After all, the real competition here is between forms,
 not between states. Delaware might offer, for example, a shareholder-
 oriented statute with extensive rights for shareholders to nominate and
 elect all directors annually, and with the British City Code rules inhibiting
 defensive tactics in takeovers. At the same time, as an alternative choice,
 Delaware might offer a more managerial statute that provides for, say, a
 self-perpetuating board, more or less along the lines of the European
 industrial foundations (Thomsen, 2004). And perhaps it might offer a
 third form in between, something like what we have now. Each form
 could then be updated regularly by statute and judiciai decision to main-
 tain its basic character without letting it become obsolete. In short, if, as
 some have convincingly argued, Delaware is effectively the only state that
 is competing for charters (Daines, 2002), perhaps it can start competing
 with itself.
 This is essentially what Delaware has done with respect to closely held
 firms. In a conspicuous effort to remain attractive to business, Delaware
 has recently adopted, as we have noted, four new statutes for such firms.
 Added to its existing close corporation statute, it now has five different
 statutory forms suited for closely held firms. These statutes overlap sub-
 stantially, and are to a considerable extent redundant. But, evidently
 because some firms might have a preference for one set of default terms
 over the other, Delaware simply offers them all. What is to prevent Delaware
 from doing the same with a general business corporation statute?
 To some extent, this is already happening. Corporate law offers alter-
 native default terms in various areas, and this "menu" approach (Ayres,
 2005) is becoming increasingly widespread. The choice of a staggered
 board or cumulative voting are long-familiar examples. And more recently
 we see a variety of new opt-in and opt-out rules, including various anti-
 takeover provisions such as the fair price statutes already discussed, or
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 Delaware's provision for opting out of monetary liability for breach of the
 duty of care. We are beginning to develop some useful wisdom as to
 whether it is better to structure an alternative as an opt-in or an opt-out
 provision (Listokin, 2005). We could use more wisdom, however, on the
 number and types of alternatives that should be offered.
 The delegated contracting view underlines the difference between two
 different types of statutory alternatives. First, there are choices offered on a
 term-by-term basis, such as the choice of a fair price provision. Second,
 there are choices between whole systems of provisions, such as the choice
 between forming the firm under a business corporation statute or under an
 LLC statute (or under Delaware's business corporation statute, as opposed
 to California's business corporation statute). It is also conceivable to have
 intermediate approaches in which a set of alternative terms is linked
 together, such as providing the option to adopt something like the British
 City Code rules on takeovers, which limit both the actions of potential
 acquirers (the mandatory bid rule) and the actions of the company's man-
 agers (no defensive tactics without shareholder approval). In general terms,
 the first approach seems most appropriate when there is uncertainty as to
 what is the most efficient rule. The second approach, in contrast, seems most
 appropriate where firms differ substantially in their ownership structure or
 their line of business (e.g., a mutual fund versus an industrial firm). The
 intermediate approach, in turn, could serve either purpose.
 Conclusion
 The law of business organizations is today going simultaneously in two
 different directions. At one end, principally in the realm of the closely held or
 special-purpose firm, the law is becoming increasingly contractual. Here, at the
 limit, organizational law simply offers the asset partitioning that defines cred-
 itors' rights, and leaves all relationships among the owners and managers of the
 assets to private design. At this end, organizational law is beginning to form a
 continuum with the law of commercial contracting, and legal entities are
 becoming just security interests. At the other end, in the realm of the general-
 purpose public company, organizational law, in contrast, looks highly regula-
 tory and seems to resist contractualization. Indeed, it seems to be becoming
 rather less contractual, as the securities laws, stock exchange listing rules, and
 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increasingly dictate the permissible structures.
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 The apparent reason for the divergence is that the increased sophistica-
 tion in financial contracting that is driving contractualization at the one
 end has not been matched by progress in solving the problems of adaptive
 collective governance that drive the other end. As a consequence, it seems
 likely that the charters of public companies will continue to be written by
 the visible hand of government for some time to come.
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